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HOW TO READ PLATO'S PARMENIDES 
John Gray Cox 
Plato had a simple and straightforward defense of the 
doctrine of participation to offer in response to the 
"third man argument" of the Parmenides. Forms are self-
sustaining and self-evident in character and so neither 
their existence nor our knowldege of them need to be ex-
plained by appeal to higher order forms. They are not, 
in any significant sense, self-predicting and no regress 
of forms can or need be generated. Plato's reasons for 
not defending the theory of forms in the Parmenides were 
pedagogical. The dialogue was designed to initiate the 
transition in students' knowledge from the mode of 
dianoia to that of episteme. The Republic's account of 
the education of philosophers can be used to specify the 
pedagogical intentions which motivate the Parmenides and 
determine its structure and content 
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Plato's Parmenides partakes of peculiarity. It is not 
an early dialogue, but it takes the form of elenchic Socratic 
dialogue so characteristic of the early period. What is more 
surprising is that the Socratic method is employed not by 
Socrates but on him. What is perhaps most surprising of all 
is that it contains an argument (the "~hird Man Argument," 
or TMA) which purports to provide a devastating criticism of 
Plato's own theroy of forms -- one that Socrates seems unable 
to adequately respond to. 
It has been suggested by Gregory Vlastos and others that 
Plato's presentation of the TMA marks some kind of discontin-
uity in his thought, that it was a forthright and exceptionally 
honest expression of a growing perplexity he felt concerning 
the doctorine of participation and the theory of forms. 
("The TMA in the Parmenides," Gregory Vlastos, to be found 
in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen; Humanities 
Press, New York, 1969) 
I shall argue that Plato was not perplexed by the TMA 
and that it does not mark any discontinuity in his thought. I 
shall do so by first analysing the TMA in order to show that 
it depends on what is generally known as the "Self Predication 
Assumption" (or "SPA"). I shall then argue that Plato did 
not believe forms were self-predicating. In further defense 
of this claim I shall argue that there are crucial flaws in 
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the textual arguments offered by Vlastos and others to show 
that he did. If Plato did not adopt the SPA, then he should 
not have been deeply troubled by the T~~ and we may hold 
that it does not mark any discontinuity in his thought. 
On any interpretation one is bound to be left wondering 
why Plato left his theory of forms undefended in the Parmenides. 
In Section IV I shall attempt to account for this via a dis-
cussion of the intended audience of the Parmenides and the 
aims Plato had in mind when writing the dialogue. 
I 
There are two versions of the TMA and they have been re-
formulated in a variety of ways. However, regardless of how 
one formulates them, it is clear that they involve some version 
of what Gregory Vlastos has called the "SPA." That is, "Any 
form can be predicative of itself. Largeness is itself large, 
F-ness is itself F." (Vlastos 2 36) In the first version, 
this is introduced (at _132a) when Parmenides says: "now take 
largeness itself and other things which are large." In the 
second version it occurs (at 132e) when Parmenides, after 
arguing that a Form is like that which is made in the image 
of it, assumes that the Form which is like the thing _must 
"share with the thing that is like it in one and the same 
thing (character). Without the$e SPA's, neither version of 
the TMA goes through for the argument's thrust is to show 
that an indefinite number of forms are required since each 
must"self-predicate" by a higher order form by virtue of 
which it is what it is and is like phenomena it is like. 
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In the next section I am going to argue that, in spite of 
the fact that the youthful Socrates provisionally accepts 
the SPA here, Plato himself did not. Thus, if the following 
argument is sound, then one may conclude that the TMA marks 
no hiatus in Plato's thought. 
II 
To explain why Plato did not hold the forms were Self-
Predicating, let me sketch his ontological views and make 
some remarks on his account of knowledge. The Timeaus gives 
the clearest account of his views. I shall focus largely on 
it, but would contend that these views are to be found in-
timated or implied in earlier dialogues. 
To explain the phenomena of the world of becoming Plato 
introduced three kinds of cause. The first is the barely in-
telligible "receptacle" of "chaos" the "material cause" 
as it were. The forms provide the second sort of cause. They 
are simply given in organic relations to one another in the 
one "eternal living creature." In contrast, the relation of 
a form to a phenomena is that of original to copy or of ex-
emplar to exemplification. The chaos is molded or made into 
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the image of the forms. This latter process is effected 
by a third kind of cause -- an efficient causality. In the 
Timaeus he calls it "the demiurge." 
I have some reservations in labelling this mode of 
causality "efficient." The term is not Plato's, and what I 
mean by it is not quite what Aristotle had in mind, much 
less what the term means in modern parlance. What I have 
in mind is a notion of causality as a kind of power -- not 
an antecedent causal event, nor a causal law -- but a force 
or power. It is what Plato calls Eros in the Symposium, and 
calls the Good in the Republic. (I shall suggest that in the 
Parmenides he calls it the "One'~) 
In the Republic, for example, Socrates says "not only 
being known is present in the things known as a consequence 
of the good, but also existence and being are in them as a 
result of it." (509b) Here the Good is clearly functioning 
as an efficient cause that is proffered as a solution to 
Plato's version of the one over many problems. While he has 
earlier spoken of the Good as a Form or Idea (508c) he here 
goes on to explicitly distinguish it from Forms by saying, 
"the good isn't being but is beyond being, exceeding it in 
dignity and power." (509b) 
He does not further specify its nature, for he holds in 
the context of the dialogue this would be impossible. One 
can only come to know the Good through a careful and prolonged 
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practice of dialectic. Indeed, it may be that Plato himself 
did not believe that the Good could be written of at all. 
(See the Second Epistle 314c) I shall have more to say of 
this in Section IV. 
In Plato's ontology, the operative metaphor is that of 
the craftsman. The demiurge is explicitly likened to a 
craftsman. (This metaphor can be found to run through the 
entire Platonic corpus. cf. Republic 595-598) A craftsman 
molds his material in the image of some model. He is an 
efficient cause which serves to force matter to exemplify 
the qualities of some original being. Similarly, in Plato's 
ontology, efficient causality makes the chaos (or material 
cause) in the image of forms -- which serve as exemplary 
causes. 
The next four points need emphasis. First, note that the 
forms are not commutative universals or "formal causes" of 
the Aristotelian variety. They are exemplary beings. As a 
result, it is a category mistake to call them self-predicat-
ing. Strictly speaking they can not be self-predicating 
simply because they are not predicates at all. Only predicates 
can be genuinely self-predicating. 
Second, the existence of the forms requires no explanation. 
Only that which is generated or destroyed need have its 
existence explained. But the forms exist eternally, unchangingly. 
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They are simply given and no explanation of their being is 
possible or required. In so far as the regress of the TMA is 
generated in order to account for the being of forms, it is 
superfluous. 
Third, the forms are self-evidently what they are. To 
know Beauty I need only turn the . gaze of my mind's eye toward . 
it (As the Demiurge does in the Timaeus). Its character and 
nature is immediately evident. In so far as the regress of 
the TMA is generated in order to account for our knowing of 
the forms, it is a superfluous regress. 
Fourth, let me deal with a further subtlety arising from 
Plato's epistemology. I only know what the predicate "is 
beautiful" means in so far as I am directly acquainted with the 
form of Beauty itself. There is a sense in which the form 
Beauty is beautiful. Indeed, it is perfectly beautiful -- were 
it not, it could not fulfill its key role in Plato's epistemology. 
And the process of recollecting it (described in the Symposium) 
would be impossible. However, since the meaning of the predicate 
"is beautiful" is wholly derivative from acquaintance with the 
form Beauty itself, to tell me that "Beauty is beautiful" is to 
tell me nothing at all. The sentence is not false (and it is 
not an identity claim as Allen has suggested). Rather, it is, 
strictly speaking, nonsense. 
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It can be a pedagogically useful piece of nonsense. 
Suppose someone is getting introduced to the theory of the 
forms (As in the Symposium). It will be helpful to tell 
them that Beauty is a certain marvelous beautiful nature. 
Indeed, if they were told that this claim is nonsense, they 
would be extremely puzzled. Such puzzlement would linger on 
until a rather technical account of Plato's epistemology had 
been given. More of this in Section III. 
For now let me recapitulate this section. Plato's 
theory of forms is not susceptible to the TMA. No regress 
of forms is required to explain their being or make possible 
our cognizance of them because their being is self-explanatory 
and their nature is self-evident. Their likeness to phenomena 
is explained by efficient causality and not by formal causality, 
and so, again, no regress is required to explain that. Further, 
to speak of them as self-predic~ting is to either make a cate-
gory mistake -- because they are not predicates -- or it is to 
utter superfluous nonsense -- because the predicate's meaning 
is wholly derivative from acquaintance with the forms themselves. 
III 
Contrary to the foregoing argument, it has been held by 
Vlastos and others that Plato did adopt the SPA and that there are 
various texts in which he explicitly does so. 
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There are two sets of passages which have been held to 
commit Plato to the SPA. The first and largest consists of 
passages that all occur in dialogues from the early period. 
(Lysis, 217d; Hippias Major 289c; 29le, 292e, 294a-b). It is such 
a passage from the Protagorus (330c-d) that Vlastos has held 
is "the star instance" of Self-predication in Plato. "Here 
Socrates roundly declares that justice is just and holiness is 
holy. 'What other thing could be holy, if holiness isn't 
holy,' he asks, indignant at the idea that anyone could gainsay 
that holiness is holy." (Allen, 249) 
The main difficulty with Vlastos' "star instance," and all 
of the others to be found in the early dialogues, is this. The 
theory of forms does not appear in any of these dialogues. In 
them, it is motive forces on states of soul which are being 
investigated, not metaphysical entities. Plato is not concerned 
with ontological questions about forms, but is asking substantial 
psychological questions about moral virtues. (cf. T. Penner, 
"The Unity of Virtue," Philosophical Review, 82 (1973), 35-68). 
Since Socrates is not talking about forms when he speaks of 
holiness and the like, he can not be thought to be claiming 
forms are self-predicating. 
The second class of passages which are thought to commit 
Plato to the SPA are found in the middle dialogues. There are 
three: Two in the Phaedo and one in the Symposium. ·contra 
31 
Vlastos, I believe a careful examination of Socrates' discourse 
in the Phaedo shows that he does not imply that the forms are 
self-predicating (I show this in detail in the appendix). 
Under some readings one may hold that Diotima's speech 
(as recounted by Socrates) has passages which explicitly affirm 
that the Beauty is beautiful. Does such a statement by Diotima 
commit Plato to the SPA? I think not -- for three reasons: 
First, the speech is not an espousal by Socrates but a 
report he makes of Diotima's speech. Second, it is not a well-
concluded philosophical investigation that is reported but an 
oracular ·statement of a priestess, expressing inspired insight, 
not rigorous philosophical conclusions. These two considerations 
strongly suggest that one should not expect to find any rigorous 
technical points in the speech, and that this is why there is no 
explicit denial of Self-Predication. A third point provides 
further explanation. Since Socrates' audience (as well as Plato's) 
is just being introduced to the theory of forms, they would be 
astonished at a denial of Self-Predication as Socrates would 
have been himself in the early dialogues such as the Pro~agorus 
where Self-Predication could be legitimately employed since it · 
involved no ontological claims. For Socrates to make a technical 
point of denying Self-Predication while reporting the climax of 
Diotima's sublime eulogy of Beauty would have been rhetorically 
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and pedagogically foolish. On the contrary, from a pedagogical 
point of view, the wisest thing is to tell the audience Beauty 
is "a certain marvelous beautiful nature," for this will help 
them orient their minds' eyes in the appropriate direction. 
IV 
I have argued that Plato had a simple and s -traightforward 
defense of the doctrine of participation to offer in response 
to the TMA which he could easily have presented in the Parmenides. 
Forms are not self-predicative and ~ what they are in and of 
themselves and not by virtue of higher order forms. Hence, no 
regress of forms can be or need be generated. Still, this leaves 
us wondering why he did not come out and offer this argument in 
the Parmenides instead of leaving his theory of forms so seem-
ingly vulnerable. In this section, I am going to argue that his 
reasons were primarily pedagogical. 
I believe the Parmenides was written for the purpose of 
educating students who had already beeh given some introduction 
to dialectic and who were familiar, in a general way, with the 
theory of forms. Its pedagogical purpose was to initiate them 
to the long and difficult process of dialectic by which they 
might come to know the "gooda or "One." In terms of Plato's 
cave allegory, the function of the Parmenides was to "turn the 
eyes" of students already outside in the daylight up towards 
the "sun." It's purpose was to stimulate active thought, so 
no solutions are given in it. In short, Plato wrote the 
Parmenides for an audience of young philosophers not unlike 
the Socrates that appears in the dialogues. 
Socrates is depicted as being a young man who has 
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studied philosophy for a time and is not unfamiliar with the 
basic method of dialectic. He has adopted a theory of forms, · 
but as an hypothesis, in the manner of a geometer, with dianoia 
and not episteme. He is, for example, not yet sure what a form 
is. He suggests that it may be a psychic entity or perhaps an 
independent ontological one. (Compare 132b with 133d) 
Parmenides critiques both sorts of accounts of the forms. 
But his aim is not to get Socrates to reject the theory and 
adopt some other. As Parmenides himself points out, if one 
denies the existence of the forms this will "destroy the 
significance of all discourse." (135c) Parmenides' aim is 
rather to make Socrates think more deeply about the Theory 
of Forms. The remark with which Parmenides concludes the 
second version of the TMA is an explicit encouragement to 
further investigation. "It follows that other things do not 
partake of forms by being like them, we must look for some 
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other means ey which they partake." (133a) As I argued in 
Section II, the means by which they partake is the efficient 
causality which makes them in the image of the forms them-
selves. The task Parmenides is setting before Socrates is 
the investigation of this ultimate principle. 
Socrates clearly needs to be motivated in this way to 
further investigation. He himself admits that he has not yet 
fully thought through the theory of forms. When asked, for 
instance, if he believes there are forms for trivial and un-
dignified objects, he replies that he finds the view absurd, 
but has doubts about the issue. He says he retreats from 
investigating the matter and occupies his time thinking about 
the forms of more dignified things. (138d) Parmenides 
conunents "That is because you are still young, Socrates, and 
philosophy has not yet taken hold of you so firmly as I believe 
it will some day." (130e) As the dialogue proceeds, it becomes 
clear that Parmenides is attempting to make philosophy take a 
firmer hold of Socrates. After giving Socrates the philosophi-
cal shock treatment that makes up the early part of the dialogue 
he pointedly tells Socrates that his difficulties in an~wering 
the questions put to him arise, 
•.• because you are undertaking to define 
'beautiful,' 'just,' 'good,' and other particular 
forms, too soon, before you have had a preliminary 
training •.. you must make an effort and submit 
yourself, while you are still young, to a severer 
training in what the world calls idle talk and 
considers as useless. Otherwise, the truth will 
escape you. (135b) 
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In other words, Socrates is being told that to deal with 
his difficulties he must carefully and strenuously exercise 
himself in dialectic. At Socrates' request, Parmenides then 
goes on to briefly explain the full nature of such an exercise 
and to provide him with a long and brilliant example of it. 
It is significant that the example chosen concerns the 
nature of the One. I think Aristotle is to be believed when he 
tells us that Plato held that the One was identical with the 
Good. Both expressions are ones Plato used to refer to the 
ultimate principle. In the Republic Socrates tells us that 
the purpose o£ training in dialectic is to enable a philosopher 
to apprehend the Good, the first principle of all, "beginning 
of the whole" (Republic Sllb) Clearly, this is the same prin-
ciple as the One, for, "If there is no One, there is nothing 
at all." (Parmenides 166c) 
By focusing on the one in his example of dialectic, 
Parmenides manages to not only generally motivate and guide 
Socrates' training by example, but to also begin turning his 
gaze towards the "sun." 
I think we should assume Plato's pedagogical intentions 
in writing this dialogue were not unlike those of the Parmenides 
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who speaks in it. Plato must have had a number of students at 
the Academy (and perhaps elsewhere) who had reached a develop-
ment parallel to that of the young Socrates interrogated in the 
dialogue. The theory of education presented in the Republic 
gives us good grounds for believing that Plato thought such 
students needed to have their eyes turned toward the sun just 
as Socrates' eyes are turned by Parmenides. 
To conclude my essay, let me reaffirm my central claims. 
The TMA did not mark any hiatus in Plato's thought. His theory 
of forms is not vulnerable to it because it does not involve 
a "self-predication" of any form by a higher order form in virtue 
of which that lower order form is what it is. Plato's reasons for 
not defending the Theory of Forms in the Parmenides were peda-
gogical. The TMA was not a source of any discontinuity in Plato's 
thought. Rather it is best understood in its functioning to 
initiate students to the process of dialectic. The only dis-
continuity marked by the TMA is that between the periods of 
dianoia and episteme in the educational careers of the young 
"Socrates" who were Plato's disciples and whom Plato sought to 
make in the image of the original. 
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APPENDIX 
There are two passages in the· Phaedo sometimes thought 
to commit Plato to the SPA. A close examination of these 
texts shows that they do not commit Plato to the SPA. One 
of these passages in the Phaedo is at lOOc. Vlastos suggests 
that Socrates there presumes "Self-Predication" when he in-
dulges in the expression, 'if anything else is beautiful, 
besides Beauty itself.'" (Allen 249-250) I submit that this 
expression is merely a convenient one Socrates makes use of to 
explain to Cebes the doctrine of causality provided by the 
theory of forms. One should think of it as a "pre-theoretical" 
or "introductory" expression, so to speak. The full text 
(in Tredennick's translation) is: 
Then consider the next step, and see whether you 
share my opinion. It seems to me that whatever else 
is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful 
because it partakes of that absolute beauty, and for 
no other reason. Do you accept this kind ofcausal-
ity? (lOOc) 
Here Socrates is not implying that absolute beauty is 
beautiful. Strictly speaking, he is simply referring to that 
which is apart from absolute beauty (in the world of sense) and 
is beautiful. 
The reason Socrates does not make a point of saying that, 
strictly speaking, we cannot say absolute beauty is beautiful 
and uses a locution that might be construed to the contrary is 
that the speech context is not one in which strict speaking is 
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yet possible. The audience is just being introduced to the 
theory of forms. Both Socrates' imaginary audience and 
Plato's actual audience were familiar with the psychic notions 
of the early dialogues in which "Self-Predication" was 
legitimately employed and would have been needlessly troubled 
by an introduction of a more technical point concerning the 
Self-Predication of forms. 
The same general analysis can be applied with equal force 
to the other case of alleged Self-Predication in the Phaedo 
noted by Allen. In speaking of sticks, Socrates asks, "Do they 
seem to us to be equal in the sense of absolute equality, or do 
they fall short of it in so far as they only approximate to 
equality?" (74d} 
Moreover, this passage is preceded by one in which Socrates 
is meticulous in not predicating equality of itself. He asks, 
"have you ever thought that things that were absolutely equal 
were unequal, or that equality was inequality?" If Socrates was 
comfortable with the assumption of Self-Predication then he would 
not have hesitated to ask if equality was ever unequal. That 
he is carefu~ in not phrasing his question in this way counts as 
good evidence that he did not assume Self-Predication -- much 
better ,than any counter-evidence that the loose pre-theoretic 
locutions alluded to by Vlastos and Allen supply. 
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